On Informal Institutions and Accounting Behavior
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- Udgivet:
- 6. januar 2022
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- 155x235x0 mm.
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- 13. december 2024
Forlænget returret til d. 31. januar 2025
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- Adgang til 70.000+ titler
- Ingen binding
Abonnementet koster 75 kr./md.
Ingen binding og kan opsiges når som helst.
Beskrivelse af On Informal Institutions and Accounting Behavior
1 Informal Institution and Accounting: Introduction and Outline1.1 The Aim of this Book
1.2 Core Concepts
1.2.1 Accounting Behavior
1.2.2 Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions
1.3 The Coexistence between Formal and Informal Institutions: A Diagram
1.4 The Relation between Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions1.5 Layout and Content of This Book
1.6 The Potential Theoretical Contributions
1.7 Extended Readings
1.8 Conclusion
Reference
2 Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial Misstatement
2.1 Introduction2.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development
2.2.1 Surname and Its Influence in Contemporary China
2.2.2 The Chinese Audit Market and Auditor Independence
2.2.3 Literature Review
2.2.4Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial Misstatement
2.2.5 Rare Surname versus Common Surname
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 1
2.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 2
2.3.3 Sample
2.3.4 Data Source
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
2.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis
2.4.3 Regression Results of Hypothesis 1
2.4.4 Regression Results of Hypothesis 2
5
2.4.5 Robustness Checks Using the Number of Signing Auditors Sharing the Same Surname with the
CEO
2.4.6 Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of Financial Misstatement
2.4.7 Robustness Checks Using the Expanded Samples
2.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests
2.5.1 Time-Series Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event
2.5.2 Subsample Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event
2.5.3 Additional Tests Using both Time and Individual Effects under an Exogenous Regulatory Event
2.5.4 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach
2.5.5 The Effects of Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing on MAO and Abnormal Audit Fees
2.5.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis Considering Institutional Environment
2.5.7 Additional Tests Considering Auditor-CEO Hometown Relationship and School Ties
2.5.8 Additional Tests Based on the Integrated Variables Combining Surname Sharing and Hometown
Relationship
2.6 Conclusion, Managerial Implications, and Limitations
Reference
3 CEO-Director Surname Connectedness and Corporate Misconduct
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, Hypotheses Development
3.2.1 Surname in the Chinese Context
3.2.2 Prior Literature on Surname Distribution and Surname Connectedness
3.2.3 Prior Literature on Corporate Misconduct3.2.4 The Influence of CEO-Director Surname Connectedness on Corporate Misconduct
3.2.5 The Moderating Effect of the popularity of the CEO''s surname
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Empirical Model Specification for H1
3.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for H2
3.3.3 Research Sample Identification
3.3.4 Data Source
3.4 Empirical Findings
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
3.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis
6
3.4.3Multivariate Test of H1 and H2 (Main Findings)
3.4.4 Robustness Checks Using the Ratio of CEO-Director Surname Connectedness
3.4.5Robustness Checks Using the Number of Corporate Misconduct
3.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests
3.5.1 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach
3.5.2 Additional Tests
3.6 Conclusions, Managerial Implications, and Limitations
Reference
4 CEO-Auditor Hometown Complex and Pre-IPO Earnings Management4.1 Introduction
4.2 Institutional Back
1.2 Core Concepts
1.2.1 Accounting Behavior
1.2.2 Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions
1.3 The Coexistence between Formal and Informal Institutions: A Diagram
1.4 The Relation between Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions1.5 Layout and Content of This Book
1.6 The Potential Theoretical Contributions
1.7 Extended Readings
1.8 Conclusion
Reference
2 Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial Misstatement
2.1 Introduction2.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development
2.2.1 Surname and Its Influence in Contemporary China
2.2.2 The Chinese Audit Market and Auditor Independence
2.2.3 Literature Review
2.2.4Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing and Financial Misstatement
2.2.5 Rare Surname versus Common Surname
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 1
2.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 2
2.3.3 Sample
2.3.4 Data Source
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
2.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis
2.4.3 Regression Results of Hypothesis 1
2.4.4 Regression Results of Hypothesis 2
5
2.4.5 Robustness Checks Using the Number of Signing Auditors Sharing the Same Surname with the
CEO
2.4.6 Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of Financial Misstatement
2.4.7 Robustness Checks Using the Expanded Samples
2.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests
2.5.1 Time-Series Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event
2.5.2 Subsample Tests Using an Exogenous Regulatory Event
2.5.3 Additional Tests Using both Time and Individual Effects under an Exogenous Regulatory Event
2.5.4 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach
2.5.5 The Effects of Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing on MAO and Abnormal Audit Fees
2.5.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis Considering Institutional Environment
2.5.7 Additional Tests Considering Auditor-CEO Hometown Relationship and School Ties
2.5.8 Additional Tests Based on the Integrated Variables Combining Surname Sharing and Hometown
Relationship
2.6 Conclusion, Managerial Implications, and Limitations
Reference
3 CEO-Director Surname Connectedness and Corporate Misconduct
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Institutional Background, Literature Review, Hypotheses Development
3.2.1 Surname in the Chinese Context
3.2.2 Prior Literature on Surname Distribution and Surname Connectedness
3.2.3 Prior Literature on Corporate Misconduct3.2.4 The Influence of CEO-Director Surname Connectedness on Corporate Misconduct
3.2.5 The Moderating Effect of the popularity of the CEO''s surname
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Empirical Model Specification for H1
3.3.2 Empirical Model Specification for H2
3.3.3 Research Sample Identification
3.3.4 Data Source
3.4 Empirical Findings
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
3.4.2 Pearson Correlation Analysis
6
3.4.3Multivariate Test of H1 and H2 (Main Findings)
3.4.4 Robustness Checks Using the Ratio of CEO-Director Surname Connectedness
3.4.5Robustness Checks Using the Number of Corporate Misconduct
3.5 Endogeneity and Additional Tests
3.5.1 Endogeneity Tests Using the Propensity Score Matching Approach
3.5.2 Additional Tests
3.6 Conclusions, Managerial Implications, and Limitations
Reference
4 CEO-Auditor Hometown Complex and Pre-IPO Earnings Management4.1 Introduction
4.2 Institutional Back
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