Bøger udgivet af University Press of the Pacific

This book is an outgrowth of a collaborative effort of two strategic studies centers, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, and the National Center for Middle East Studies in Cairo, Egypt. Over a period of several years, a group of colleagues connected with these institutes has been engaged in conferences and discussions focusing on the future of Egypt and the U.S.-Egyptian relationship in the changing security environment of the post-Cold War Middle East. This volume, the fruit of those labors, brings together the work of a distinguished group of Egyptians and Americans, combining the research efforts and long practical experience of authors of diverse backgrounds, including academics, military professionals, economists, and policy makers. Authors originally prepared their papers for two conferences, one on Egypt's domestic stability held in Washington, the other on Egypt's regional role, held in Cairo; their work has been updated to reflect changing events. Egypt has a seminal role as a Middle East actor and is central in U.S. strategic planning on the Middle East. Because of Egypt's influence in the Arab and Islamic worlds, it is of paramount importance that Egypt remain a force for moderation. Any dramatic change in Egypt's position could alter the regional balance of power and the existing favorable security environment. Egypt's regional role as a moderating element depends on its domestic tranquility and its economic health. As authors in this volume emphasize, the domestic and regional aspects of Egypt's policy are inextricably linked. Without a reasonably sound economy and political stability, Egypt will be unable to undertake an active regional role. The reverse is also true-an active peace process and a growing regional economy are essential for Egypt's stability at home. The combined essays tie together three essential components of the U.S.-Egyptian equation. The first part addresses domestic issues in Egypt and the prospects for Egypt's continued political stability. The second section concentrates on Egypt's regional role in the new post-Cold War environment. The third part looks at the future of the U.S.-Egyptian partnership. Authors have probed the underlying factors likely to persist well into the 21st century, rather than dwelling on episodic changes that may dominate tomorrow's headlines. It is hoped that exploration of these fundamental aspects of Egypt and the U.S.-Egyptian relationship will provide a sense of the forces at work in the region and of the issues with which U.S. strategists will have to grapple over the next decade.

The mid-twentieth century has added new dimensions to the roles and missions long performed by the United States Army. In many lands whose peoples speak alien tongues and observe strange customs, the American soldier is now living and working as ally, friend, and counselor. As a representative of the American way of life, as a persuasive advocate of his country's modern equipment and tactical doctrine, as partner in a global system of achieving security for the entire free world, he is called upon to demonstrate a variety of talents---patience, tact, linguistic ability, and superior professional knowledge, among others. In all that he does, he must make a supreme effort to understand people and traditions often vastly different from his own. One of the pioneers in this new type of Army endeavor was the Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, commonly known as KMAG. The men and officers who served in KMAG during the early days came to know all the frustrations and triumphs, the problems and partial solutions, the failures and successes that characterize new ventures. Major Sawyer and Mr. Hermes have vividly recaptured the spirit and actions of the men of both nations whose joint efforts established a remarkable record of achievement. Though this volume describes the Army's experience in Korea only, the lessons it contains have great value to an officer assigned to advisory group duty in any nation. The book will also introduce the general public to the manner in which the United States soldier can and does meet the ever-changing tasks demanded of him by his countrymen. A professional soldier and a professional military historian pooled their talents to prepare this work. Major Saver, presently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, wrote his manuscript while on duty with the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1951 to 1955. A combat veteran of both World War II and the Korean War, he received a battlefield commission in France in 1945 and fought in Korea in 1950 with the 25th Infantry Division. He holds the Silver Star, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Purple Heart. Mr. Hermes, also a World War II veteran, is a graduate of Boston University, where he received an M.A. degree in 1942, and is currently completing requirements for a Ph.D. degree in history at Georgetown University. A staff member of the Office of the Chief of Military History since 1949, he is the author of Truce Tent and Fighting Front, a forthcoming volume in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR.William H. HarrisBrigadier General, U.S.A.Chief of Military History

Once termed a police action, the Korean War was fought by massed armies on a constricted field of operations. Its battles were as intense as those of any other war this century. The Medics' War views this conflict from an uncommon angle. It documents the efforts of American Army doctors, nurses, and enlisted medics to save life and repair the damages wrought by wounds and disease. Though the charges of biological warfare made at the time are shown to have no foundation, the disease-ridden environment of wartime Korea aided the side with the best medical care. The real MASH clearly emerges in this study, along with the variety of technical innovations produced by the conflict that have advanced medical science. The perspective of The Medics' War is an enlightening one, showing that the compassionate treatment of both United Nations and enemy wounded preserved human values in the midst of bitter, unforgiving strife. Civilian and military readers alike will gain from it a deeper understanding of the processes, destructive and reconstructive, that together made up the human experience of the Korean War. William A. Stofft Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History

CONTENTSTHE AMERICAN THIRD ARMY Preface Organization of Third Army Operation Instructions in Connection With Armistice Conditions Encountered in Advance Plans for Crossing the German Frontier Entry Into Germany Plans for Crossing the Rhine Occupation for the Coblenz Bridgehead Movement of Third Army Into Germany Completed Strength of Third Army, December 19, 1918 Composition of Third Army as of December 23, 1918 Plan in Event of Renewal of Hostilities Field Orders Prescribing Procedure in Event Enemy Refuses To Sign Peace Treaty German Government Signs Peace Treaty Strength, July 2, 1919 Army Troops, November 15, 1918-July 2, 1919 History of the American Third Army, November 14, 1918-July 2, 1919AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY Preface Military Government During the March to the Rhine Administration of Military Government in American Occupied Territory Military Tribunals Ordinances, Their Interpretations and Later Modifications Food Supply of Civil Population in American Occupied Territory Public Works and Utilities Relations Between Army and Civil Population Finance and Requisitions American Supervision of German Civil Government The Rhenish Separatist MovementGERMAN CAMPAIGN PLANS Preface Early German Estimate of American Strength Germany Plans Smashing Blow Against British Front British Give Way in Southern Area Before Heavy German Attacks In Spite of Early Success, Germans Fail To Reach Amiens by March 28, 1918 Ludendorff Orders Offensive To Be Halted German Estimate of Combat Value of American Troops Beginning of Bluecher Attack German Attack in Aisne Area Comes to a Halt German Propaganda Efforts for Americans German Attack in Marne Area Stalled Ludendorff Admits Failure of Reims Attack Germans Go on Defensive, August 1918 Situation on the West Front, September 1, 1918 Estimate of Situation Preceding St-Mihiel Attack Results of German Defensive Battles Proposal To Enter Peace Negotiations Information About American Army Preparations by Germans To Withdraw Into Prepared Rearward Positions Definite Orders for Retirement From the Fighting Front Group of Armies Ordered To Withdraw Into Hermann Position Directions for Execution of Antwerp-Meuse Movement Estimate of Situation, October 31, 1918 Cessation of Hostilities

This book seeks to recount the air experience and development before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of strategic air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offer criticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict. In retrospect I find that I have been singularly fortunate in my associations and assignments. I have been associated with many great men and have been in position to observe great events. In the decade before World War II, I had a priceless opportunity to work with Bob Olds, Harold Lee George, Ken Walker, Don Wilson, and Muir "Santy" Fairchild, under the guidance, inspiration, and benign protection of the Commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Col. John F. Curry. My associates also included Ira C. Eaker, who combined great ability as a staff executive with superlative leadership as Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force in England. I worked under that superb airman, Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. I was caught up in the dedication and driving spirit of Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Air Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force. And I had the special privilege of working for the greatest soldier of our day, and perhaps of any day, a man of superb integrity and highest character: Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Catlett Marshall. The observations contained in this book constitute a memoir, with all the shortcomings of faulty memory, bias, personal viewpoint, personal experience, and inadequate research that are implied in the term. They lead to speculation on probable results of alternative actions or conditions, and that speculation is likewise suspect because it reflects personal judgment. But the compendium may lead others to derive lessons and conclusions which fit into a broader mosaic.

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects---how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

In view of their crucial importance to military success, mobilization and logistics deserve thorough attention from historians. Although the Army's ability to mobilize has improved in recent years, much remains to be done, and the Korean War experience can provide valuable insights. Planners involved in the attempt to perfect current automated manpower mobilization systems need to prepare for possible strains and even collapse of those systems. In an emergency, we may have to rely on manual methods such as those that saw us through the Korean War. Industrial preparedness also has received increased emphasis and support in the last decade. But in this area, as well, there is much to be learned from the Korean War's partial mobilization. Finally, we can study with profit the problems encountered in supplying the large forces that we fielded in Korea. Planners who deal with theater logistics could benefit from detailed analysis, solidly grounded in original sources, of those problems and the solutions devised for them during the war. This monograph should provide impetus to examine Korean War mobilization and logistics. Through a discussion of the available literature, the author presents an overview of the most pertinent issues addressed thus far. He then suggests how future investigators might elaborate on particular points, and offers topics that warrant further research. WILLIAM A. STOFFT Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History

The story of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea is a difficult one, both for the veterans of the unit and for the Army. In the early weeks of the Korean War, most American military units experienced problems as the U.S. Army attempted to transform understrength, ill-equipped, and inadequately trained forces into an effective combat team while at the same time holding back the fierce attacks of an aggressive and well-prepared opponent. In addition to the problems other regiments faced in Korea, the 24th Infantry also had to overcome the effects of racial prejudice. Ultimately the soldiers of the regiment, despite steadfast courage on the part of many, paid the price on the battlefield for the attitudes and misguided policies of the Army and their nation. Several previously published histories have discussed what happened to the 24th Infantry. This book tells why it happened. In doing so, it offers important lessons for today's Army. The Army and the nation must be aware of the corrosive effects of segregation and the racial prejudices that accompanied it. The consequences of that system crippled the trust and mutual confidence so necessary among the soldiers and leaders of combat units and weakened the bonds that held the 24th together, producing profound effects on the battlefield. I urge the reader to study and reflect on the insights provided in the chapters that follow. We must ensure that the injustices and misfortunes that befell the 24th never occur again.

On 10 November 1775 the Second Continental Congress authorized the raising of two battalions of Marines. From this small beginning we have seen the United States Marine Corps grow into a powerful force for the nation's security. In this volume, through the actions and words of the participants, we read of a small Marine force which promptly challenged Great Britain's control on both land and sea. Our first amphibious raid landed in the Bahamas on 3 March 1776, capturing gravely needed munitions, and proving to the foe that the infant American Marine Corps was a threat to be reckoned with. Likewise we read of small bands of Marines who dared to stand in the way of British troops at Princeton, New Jersey, and Charleston, South Carolina. And we also learn of the little-known Marine expedition down the Mississippi River under naval Captain James Willing in 1778. Historians, past and present, all too often neglect completely the maritime history of the American Revolution or they pass over it with superficial attention. Mr. Charles R. Smith has corrected this omission with respect to Continental Marines. Based on extensive and careful research, the author has rescued from oblivion those actions from which our modern concepts of amphibious warfare have grown. Mr. Smith has been a member of the staff of the History and Museums Division since July 1971. He holds Bachelor of Arts degrees in History and Political Science from the University of California, a Master of Arts degree in History from San Diego State University, and is working toward a Doctorate in History at The American University. He also served in the Republic of Vietnam as an Army artilleryman and field historian. Since joining the division, Mr. Smith has authored a historical pamphlet entitled, A Brief History of the 12th Marines, and articles for the division's newsletter, Fortitudine.

Chapters in this volume include: Patrick and the Revision of the Ancient Irish Law; Introduction to the Senchus Mor; Cain Patrick: The Law of Fosterage; Cain Patrick: The Law of Lord and Tenant; Cain Patrick: The Law of Social Connections; Corus Bescna: The Secular Law of Social Obligations; Corus Eaglasta: Patrick's Ecclesiastical Policy; The Organisation of the Kindred in the Geilfine System; Developments Arising out of the Institution of the Composite Family; Rank Duty, and Privilege in Ancient Irish Society; The Law of Torts as Criminal Law; The Law of Torts as Civil Law; Administration of the Law of Torts by Distraint; The Law of Sick Maintenance; Of Taking Lawful Possession of Land; Rights of Women as Owners of Property; On the Incidence of Fines Under the Law of Torts; and The Law as Schoolmaster. Sophie Bryant was the first woman to receive a Doctor of Science in England, her subject being mental and moral philosophy. She was one of the first three women to be appointed to a Royal Commission, the Bryce Commission on Secondary Education in 1894-95, and she was one of the first three women to be appointed to the Senate of London University. While on the Senate she advocated setting up a Day Training College for teachers which eventually became the Institute of Education. Later in 1904, when Trinity College Dublin opened its degrees to women, Bryant was one of the first to be awarded an honorary doctorate. She was also instrumental in setting up the Cambridge Training College for Women which eventually became Hughes Hall, the first postgraduate college in Cambridge.

The object of this monograph is to highlight for officers and sailors the vital contribution of the Navy to America's national security, economic prosperity and global presence during the contemporary era. Often, the deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States, protection of overseas commerce, support for international alliances and evacuation of American citizens from troubled lands abroad has been accomplished peacefully. At other times, the fleet has been called upon to go "in harm's way" to defend the global interests of the United States. The Navy, for instance, played a significant role in the Korean, Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars. Less well known, but no less important, the fleet has also been involved during the last half century in several short-term combat actions in support of U.S. foreign policy. The American confrontation with Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya during the 1980s, the subject of this monograph, was a classic example of how national objectives can often be met through such use of naval force. This method for dealing with international terrorism has been and will be an effective weapon in the president's foreign policy arsenal. The author of this study, Joseph T. Stanik, is admirably equipped to deal with the topic. His education in national security affairs, active service with the fleet in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, and experience as a naval historian have served him well in the preparation of this balanced appraisal of the Libya crisis.William S. DudleyDirector of Naval HistoryUnited States Navy

This book is a collection of accounts describing the combat action of small Army units-squads and platoons, companies and batteries. These are the units that engage in combat, suffer the casualties, and make up the fighting strength of the battalions, regiments, divisions, corps, and finally, of the field army. Combat is a very personal business to members of such a small unit. Concerned with the fearful and consuming tasks of fighting and living, these men cannot think of war in terms of the Big Picture as it is represented on the situation maps at corps or army headquarters. Members of a squad or platoon know only what they can see and hear of combat. They know and understand the earth for which they fight, the advantage of holding the high ground, the protection of the trench or hole. These men can distinguish the sounds of enemy weapons from those of their own; they know the satisfying sound of friendly artillery shells passing overhead and of friendly planes diving at an objective. They know the excitement of combat, the feeling of exhilaration and of despair, the feeling of massed power, and of overwhelming loneliness. The author has tried to describe combat as individuals have experienced it, or at least as it has appeared from the company command post. In so doing, much detail has been included that does not find its way into more barren official records. The details and the little incidents of combat were furnished by surviving members of the squads and companies during painstaking interviews and discussions soon after the fighting was over. Conversely, many facts have been omitted from the narrative presented here. The accounts tell only part of the complete story, intentionally ignoring related actions of cause and effect in order to keep one or two small units in sharper focus. The story of action on Heartbreak Ridge, for example, describes fighting that lasted only one or two hours, whereas the entire battle for that hill went on for several weeks. Sometimes there are obvious gaps because important information was lost with the men who died in the battle. Sometimes the accounts are incomplete because the author failed to learn or to recount everything of importance that happened.

This book is based upon a PhD dissertation written by an Air Force officer who studied at the University of Denver. Currently an Associate Professor of History at the Air Force Academy, Major Osur's account relates how the leadership in the War Department and the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) tried to deal with the problem of race and the prejudices which were reflected in the bulk of American society. It tells a story of black racial protests and riots which such attitudes and discrimination provoked. The author describes many of the discriminatory actions taken against black airmen, whose goal was equality of treatment and opportunities as American citizens. He also describes the role of black pilots as they fought in the Mediterranean theater of operations against the Axis powers. In his final chapters, he examines the continuing racial frictions within the Army Air Forces which led to black servicemen protests and riots in 1945 at several installations. Despite these problems, the author concludes that the Army Air Forces made substantial progress in race relations and in opening up additional career opportunities for black airmen in the post-1945 period. JOHN W. HUSTON, Maj. Gen., USAF Chief, Office of Air Force History