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An omnibus edition of nine volumes of postwar histories declassified by the National Security Agency in 2010. The research was carried out by the Army Security Agency relying on captured documents and interviews with prisoners. This is an absolutely essential primary reference for anyone interested in cryptography as a vital aspect of World War II.The volumes include:Volume I: SynopsisVolume 2: Notes on German High Level Cryptography and Cryptanalysis Volume 3: The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces Volume 4: The Signal Intelligence Service of the Army High Command Volume 5: The German Air Force Signal Intelligence ServiceVolume 6: The Foreign Office Cryptanalytic SectionVolume 7: Goering's "Research" BureauVolume 8: Miscellaneous Volume 9: German Traffic Analysis of Russian Communications

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force", was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not includedThis release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.This facsimiile edition includes:* Part V. B. 3. a. Justification of the War. Internal Documents. The Eisenhower Administration. Volume I: 1953 * Part V. B. 3. b. Justification of the War. Internal Documents. The Eisenhower Administration. Volume II: 1954 - Geneva

Nazi Germany pioneered the use of airborne forces in the 20th century and used them effectively early in the war as part of integrated, combined-arms offensives. Yet the German airborne branch literally self-destructed in 1941. What happened, how did the Germans react, and what historical insights in the use of airborne forces can modern day planners derive from the German experience? In the late 1930's, an aggressive and innovative rearmament program in Nazi Germany gave rise to the tactics of vertical envelopment. Pioneering the use of gliders as troop carriers, parachutists, and the air landing of reinforcements to exploit tactical success, the German Wehrmacht used the new technique of airborne warfare with startling success as part of the Blitzkrieg campaign against the Low Countries and France in 1940. When the tactical doctrine used to seize bridges, strong points and road junctions in Fall Gelb was transferred to the seizure of an entire island that was heavily defended in 1941, however, the German airborne effectively committed suicide. In ten days in May 1941, half the airborne forces in the entire German army were killed or wounded on Crete. Hitler wrongly ascribed the disaster to a playing out of the surprise factor, and banned further parachute operations until 1943. The right conclusions were arrived at by the commander of the German airborne himself, General Kurt Student, in post-battle analysis. His own insistence on faulty tactics was devastating. Although they remained a potent and professional force, Hitler's effective ban on the future use of airborne forces lasted until 1943, when it was clear the Allies still very much considered paratroops a viable form of warfare. By then, Germany's ability to conduct airborne operations on a significant scale had long since passed. The German innovation of vertical envelopment in the 1930's was as revolutionary to modern military tactics as the simultaneous development of the integrated combined arms offensive known today as the Blitzkrieg. In putting Billy Mitchell's ideas into practice, Luftwaffe General Student demonstrated vision, innovative thinking and practical military skill. Poor intelligence and reliance on his "spreading oil drops" tactics for the deployment of his paratroopers, the Fallschirmtruppe, on Crete, however, led directly to their removal as a significant weapon from the German arsenal in World War II. Nevertheless, Student proved that airborne troops have unique capabilities as a force multiplier in both offensive and defensive warfare. The German experience, which also demonstrated the limitations of airborne forces, was studied in depth by the U.S. Army after the war and incorporated into airborne doctrine.

On 20 May 1941, Generaloberst Kurt Student's Luftwaffe XI Fliegerkorps conducted the first operational airborne invasion in history to seize Crete. Major-General Bernard Cyril Freyberg VC, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, commanded the British forces defending the island. Freyberg, forewarned of the details of the invasion, possessed numerical superiority over the enemy, but was defeated within twelve days. Freyberg, later blamed for the defeat due to his perceived faulty defensive dispositions, was dealt a losing hand from the start. His troops consisted of those that could be rescued from the failed Greek Campaign and lacked sufficient weapons, communications, and transport to conduct the defense. Despite the best efforts of the Royal Navy, overwhelming Luftwaffe air superiority in the absence of the Royal Air Force isolated Crete and the relentless drive of the attacking German forces captured it. Poor tactical leadership by Freyberg's subordinate commanders and their failure to prosecute his operational plan led to defeat by the barest margin. While a tactical loss, Freyberg's destruction of the 7th Flieger Division resulted in Hitler never considering an operational airborne assault again.

In 1941, after the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, senior German military leaders were considering two airborne operations, one for the invasion of Crete and the other for the invasion of Malta. The invasion of Crete was executed from 20 May to 1 June 1941 with heavy German losses. The invasion of Malta never took place even though the senior military leaders in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) recommended invading Malta over Crete because of its strategic importance, but were overridden by Adolf Hitler. A year later, while the North Africa campaign was being conducted, another invasion was planned for Malta, but within a few weeks of executing the plan it too was postponed and eventually cancelled. Why was Crete invaded in 1941, but Malta was not? Why in 1942 was a second planned invasion of Malta rejected and abandoned, and what were the strategic repercussions of not invading Malta? The Axis never captured Malta, and the offensive capability of Malta was never destroyed. This was a critical factor in the defeat of all Axis forces in North Africa.

At the end of World War I, and upon the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Armed Forces had been drastically reduced by the Allies. The German Navy was stripped of its battleships, submarines, and aircraft. The effort to rebuild began immediately following the war. The decision about what direction and shape the Navy would take was influenced by several factors. The German Navy's anticipated enemy, the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the political situation all played a part in the development of the post-World War I German Navy. At least as important as any of these factors was the influence of two prominent naval theorists, A.T. Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett. This thesis examined the extent that the theories of Mahan and Corbett influenced the development of German Naval Strategy between 1930 and 1936. The period includes the remnants of the Weimar Republic, the ascension of Adolf Hitler, and the signing of the Anglo-German Naval agreement in 1935, and finally the first of naval developments after the treaty. Understanding the role of Mahan in the development of the Kriegsmarine is essential for any student of modern naval history.

Three U.S. officers -- one from the Air Force, one from the Army, and one from the Navy -- met at the Joint Forces Staff College to argue that a truly "joint" approach could have produced success for Hitler in Operation Sea Lion, the proposed invasion of England in 1940. Military history contains many lessons from which the warfighting doctrine of the individual services, as well as joint doctrine, is derived. World War II stands as one of the major contributors of valuable lessons learned. From a joint and combined warfighting perspective, Germany's planning and preparatory military actions to the invasion of Great Britain after the fall of France are instructive. Their plan, called Operation SEA LION by the Germans, was never carried out, as certain prerequisite conditions were never achieved, and Hitler elected to move on to other operations. But Germany could have been successful in invading and, if necessary, occupying Great Britain had they exercised joint and combined operations to achieve better unity of effort within the German military, remained focused on key British operational centers of gravity, and exploited the capabilities of friendly nations such as Spain, Italy, and the Vichy government of France.

The Germans developed an innovative and audacious airborne operational capability, which they employed at the Battle of Crete, but ignored key principles of the offense in order to validate this new concept. By their inability to achieve surprise, concentrate their forces to realize a single purpose, and control the tempo of the attack to retain the initiative, the Germans paratroops were decimated, and only through air superiority and poor Allied leadership were they able to defeat the Allies. On 21 May, 1941 German paratroopers conducted an airborne invasion of the battle of Crete. Rather than being a part of a coherent strategy to defeat the Allies in the Mediterranean, this attack was merely an attempt for Hitler to shore up his southern flank before invading Russia. The author of the airborne plan, General Kurt Student, wanted to prove that airborne troops could be used operationally and drew up the plan to attack Crete with paratroopers and air landed elite mountain troops supported by seaborne reinforcements. Lacking proper resources to conduct the attack and with only three weeks to plan, Student developed a plan to attack the island at four widespread locations. He envisioned complete surprise and failed to make any contingency plans. The Allies defending Crete, having the benefit of intercepted German communications, were prepared for the attack, but lacked the necessary weapons and supplies to properly defend the island. Ten days later the Germans had captured the island, but at a cost of over 6,000 German troops and over 170 transport aircraft. In Student's rush to prove to the Fuhrer the operational benefit of an airborne force, he ignored key principles of the offense and thus destroyed the very force he advocated. In the end, it was the individual paratrooper that brought Student his victory, but at a terrible cost. Although this Promethean event was an operational and tactical victory for the Germans, it was a Pyrrhic one at best, and Crete would forever be known as the "graveyard of the Fallschirmjäger.