Bøger af Stefan Grosse

In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict theproblem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant butthat there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest nopersonal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-goodexperiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfectconditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities,reputation-building or communication are absent.We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For examplewe introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyzewhether subjects behave differently when they do not receivenew resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We furtherprovide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-ridingproblem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second studywith a non-linear production function. However, the costlyimplementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a(second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linearpublic-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit onpunishment.