Bøger af Robert R Palmer

The series of historical studies of the Army Ground Forces, 1942-45, of which the present volume is the first to be published, was prepared during the course of the war or immediately thereafter on the responsibility of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.1 The headquarters studies in the series were written by professional historians, of whom three were officers of the Army of the United States and one a civilian. These historians were members of a historical office of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, at first a part of the G-2 Section, but on 25 June 1943 organized as a separate Historical Section. Histories of subordinate commands were prepared under the supervision of this Section by a historical officer in each command, who, except in the Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties. The studies were designed primarily for the use of the Army and were planned to be completed by the time the Army Ground Forces had discharged its war mission or shortly thereafter. Their object is to state not only what was done, but also why and how the actions recorded were taken and what lessons were learned. The judgments expressed are those of the officers concerned, not those of the historical officers. The function conceived as proper for the historical officers was to find and state the facts which seemed to have a bearing on the major problems that faced the Army Ground Forces, in the belief that in this context of facts the decisions of its commanders and the consequences of these decisions could be best understood. The studies in this volume were written during the war in the Historical Section of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, where the authors had free access to the records and experience of the command. The Historical Division of the War Department has confined material changes to such additions of information, approved by the authors, as seemed necessary to round out the picture presented. The full and frank presentation of the wartime point of view of the Army Ground Forces, which has not been affected by the changes made, is regarded as one of the most valuable features of this particular series of studies.

The present volume consists of six studies dealing with basic organizational problems of the ground forces. The first study concerns the antecedents of the Army Ground Forces, during the years 1940-42, as represented by General Headquarters, U.S. Army, from which the Army Ground Forces and its policies in respect to the organization and training of the ground troops developed. Given the limited objective inherent in the mission of the authors as members of the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, the study of General Headquarters is not an exhaustive treatise on that organization, but emphasizes its exercise of those functions and activities which were later assumed by the Army Ground Forces. Nevertheless, such subjects as the activities of GHQ in planning and directing operations and the steps involving GHQ which led to the reorganization of the Army high command in March 1942 are included, not only to round out the picture, but also to contribute to the understanding of larger questions the information found in the records of GHQ. The next four studies in this volume give an account of the principal problems and decisions of the Army Ground Forces regarding the size, internal organization, and armament of the ground troops deployed in World War II. The last study explains the part played by the Army Ground Forces in the redeployment and reorganization of the ground forces for the final assault against Japan. The point of view represented in the studies is that of General Headquarters and of the Army Ground Forces, and only their decisions are fully documented. In general, research was carried beyond the records of these two organizations only so far as seemed necessary to explain their views and decisions. No effort was made to explore facts not known to them at the time when action was recommended or taken. It is recognized that a knowledge of other facts and circumstances is necessary for a balanced judgment of their recommendations and decisions, a knowledge which will be attainable only when the history of the war, and of the part played by the War Department and the U.S. Army in winning it, has been written.