Bøger af Riley Sunderland

Although this is the second of a series covering the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations during World War II, it is a story in itself and one full of drama. The previous volume, "Stilwell's Mission to China", recounts the early efforts of the United States to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. This second volume presents the problems of a commander, his staff, and his troops in a position so irregular and complex as to be unprecedented in U.S. Army history, and outlines the background of their position in Allied policy, military and political. Their position was determined by an arrangement among allies, one accepted with reservations by the War Department. There is a saying: "There is but one thing more difficult than fighting a war with Allies-this is to fight a war without them."

This volume is centered on the performance of Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell. Stilwell was chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek, in Chiang's capacity of commander in chief of China considered as an Allied theater; he administered U.S. lend-lease aid to China; and he commanded the CBI Theater. Chiang put him in charge of his force (three Chinese armies) in Burma during the ill-fated campaign of 1942, and this campaign, insofar as it involved his authority, is therefore described. Reading the history of the China-Burma-India Theater will be an eye opener and a lesson to those who, in the future, have to deal with allies in far distant lands about whom so much should be known and so little is. Contemporary history is limited in its vision, as indeed is all history, insofar as the records are limited. This history is no exception; the records used are mainly of U.S. Army origin. However, time flies and experience of the past is essential to wisdom in the future. To wait for additional evidence might deny pertinent information to those who need it now. Moreover, the records turned up by the authors of this book are exceptionally rich. A careful reading of this volume will emphasize the necessity on the part of the leading participants in a combined venture to understand the characteristics and over-all objectives of the nations as well as the individuals concerned in the endeavor. If such an understanding is present, and if due weight is given it by those involved in negotiations as well as in the execution of the plans, the better will be the result. The degree to which this understanding was achieved by the leading participants is left for the reader to decide. Decisions, to be sound, must perforce be based on up-to-date facts. The danger of making them from information supplied from not too well informed sources, and without information that could readily have been brought to bear, is self-evident.

Time Runs Out in CBI is a history of the two U.S. theaters into which China-Burma-India was split when Stilwell was recalled, one (India-Burma) commanded by Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, the other (China) by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. This volume continues and completes the story of the north Burma campaign, recounts the operations of Chinese-American forces along the Salween River, and describes the logistical efforts of General Sultan's command. This volume, third of a subseries, carries the story of the Army's anomalous mission in China-Burma-India from the recall of General Stilwell in October 1944 to V-J Day. It deals with problems at all levels from platoon to theater, from tactics to diplomacy. The postwar concern of the Army with military assistance gives a special interest to the military advisory system that General Wedemeyer developed in the China theater to strengthen and guide the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. Stopping with the end of the war against Japan, Time Runs Out in CBI necessarily leaves the Wedemeyer story incomplete. But the authors' utilization of hitherto unused Army sources throws a light on the China tangle that should make this book useful to makers of policy, as well as interesting to readers of the history of our times.