Bøger af Franz-Peter Griesmaier

A clear and engaging introduction to the philosophy of science, exploring the role of science within the broader framework of human knowledge and engagement with the worldWhat are the central features and advantages of a scientific worldview? Why do even reasonable scientists sometimes disagree with each other? How are scientific methods different than those of other disciplines? Can science provide an objective account of reality? This is Philosophy of Science introduces the most important philosophical issues that arise within the empirical sciences.Requiring no previous background in philosophy, this reader-friendly volume covers topics ranging from traditional questions about the nature of explanation and the confirmation of theories to practical issues concerning the design of physical experiments and modeling. Incisive and accessible chapters with relevant case-studies and informative illustrations examine the function of thought experiments, discuss the realism/anti-realism debate, explore probability and theory testing, and address more challenging topics such as emergentism, measurement theory, and the manipulationist account of causation.* Describes key philosophical concepts and their application in the empirical sciences* Highlights past and present philosophical debates within the field* Features numerous illustrations, real-world examples, and references to additional resources* Includes a companion website with self-assessment exercises and instructor-only test banksPart of Wiley-Blackwell's popular This Is Philosophy series, This is Philosophy of Science: An Introduction is an excellent textbook for STEM students with interest in the conceptual foundations of their disciplines, undergraduate philosophy majors, and general readers looking for an easy-to-read overview of the subject.

What factors determine whether a person's beliefs are epistemically rational? Many traditional accounts contend that those factors lie in the beliefs themselves. For example, a belief can fit with one's evidence, it can originate in reliable (or otherwise virtuous) processes, or it can cohere with other beliefs (some of which may be self-justifying). In this provocative book, Franz-Peter Griesmaier presents a new picture of epistemic rationality, emphasizing the role of the agent rather than the belief. The rationality of an agent's beliefs ultimately depends on her epistemic sophistication, which is manifest in the stringency of her standards, in the skill she has in accessing and evaluating evidence, and in the wisdom she displays in choosing contextually appropriate standards. To be epistemically rational means, in this view, that one has discharged one's epistemic duties by using the contextually proper standards for finding and evaluating the available evidence during the process of belief formation. In the course of defending this view, Griesmaier discusses a wide variety of topics from the perspective of a unifying framework. These topics include the possibility of lucky justification, the importance of error avoidance, the problem of simplicity, various forms of evidentialism, doxastic voluntarism, epistemic deontologism, the question of belief's aim, contextualism, and the connections between his account and formal models of justification and knowledge, such as epistemic and justification logics.