Bøger af Air University Press

The Air Force global engagement vision and expeditionary air and space force strategy focus on the agile combat support (ACS) core competency as the foundation for the rapid projection of light, lean, and lethal air and space power forces. Lt. Col. J. Reggie Hall's "Agile Combat Support Doctrine and Logistics Officer Training: Do We Need an Integrated Logistics School for the Expeditionary Air and Space Force?" examines the evolution of USAF logistics doctrine, the linkage between doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training programs, and the corresponding application of logistics employment and sustainment functions in a deployed environment. In doing so, he analyzes the USAF's diverse logistics officer training programs to determine if there is a deficiency in interdisciplinary logistics employment and sustainment training. He ascertains whether or not that training shortfall reveals a gap between USAF logistics doctrine and expeditionary air and space force combat strategy. His study also investigates the USAF transition to the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) operational employment concept as the force projection mechanism for the expeditionary air and space force and the reliance on ACS as the primary enabler to identify specific areas where the absence of integrated logistics training impacts or potentially degrades mission success. After these factors have been adequately analyzed and interpreted, Colonel Hall highlights the Army logistics officer training philosophy as a benchmark to gauge the effectiveness of integrated logistics training on expeditionary strategy and logistics officer professional career development. The origins, course development, and utility of the USAF Weapons School are presented as a historical reference for creating congruency between doctrine, tactics, and training. Red Flag training exercises are offered as a model for operational requirements-driven training and as an example of the opportunity to integrate logistics employment training in existing combat exercises. The weapons school is recommended as a model for the development of an integrated agile logistics course to develop multifunctional tactical logistics expertise. An integrated logistics school is recommended as a means to bridge the gap between logistics officer training and AEF operational employment mechanisms. Colonel Hall's proposed Agile Logistics School provides a venue to strategically align logistics officer training with expeditionary air and space force strategy and ACS doctrine. His recommendation establishes congruency with the USAF's global engagement vision and leverages logistics as a force multiplier enhancing the effective employment and sustainment of air and space forces.

This volume has richly enhanced General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's reputation as the father of today's United States Air Force. Major General John W. Huston, himself an Army Air Forces combat veteran of the war, has edited each of Arnold's World War II diaries and placed them in their historical context while explaining the problems Hap faced and evaluating the results of his travels. General Huston, a professional historian, has taught at both the US Air Force Academy and the US Naval Academy. A former Chief of the Office of Air Force History and an experienced researcher both here and abroad in the personal and official papers of the war's leaders, he has been careful to let Hap speak for himself. The result is an account of the four-year odyssey that took Arnold to every continent but one as he took part in deliberations that involved Allied leaders in major diplomacy/strategy meetings with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin, Charles de Gaulle, and Chiang Kai-shek. At those meetings, Hap recorded the comments of the various participants. His 12 diaries contain his own thoughts, which range from being lost over the Himalayas to comforting the wounded as they were airlifted from the Normandy beaches. He experienced an air raid in London and viewed the carnage in recently liberated Manila. Arnold recorded his honest impressions, from private meetings with King George VI in Buckingham Palace to eating from mess kits with his combat crews in the North African desert - all while perceptively commenting on the many issues involved and assessing the people, the culture, and the surroundings. This volume offers the best assessment we have of Hap as he survived four wartime heart attacks and continued to work tirelessly for proper recognition of airpower. It will also continue my emphasis while Chief of Staff of the US Air Force on encouraging professional reading through making historical accounts available to personnel of the finest air force in the world, a success achieved in large part because of Hap Arnold. Ronald R. Fogleman General, United States Air Force, Retired.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on November 3, 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt. The Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters in London and established forward headquarters and regional headquarters in Germany immediately following the advance of the Allied armies. It made a close examination and inspection of several hundred German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and documentary material, including top German government documents; and conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans, including virtually all of the surviving political and military leaders. Germany was scoured for its war records, which were found sometimes, but rarely, in places where they out to have been; sometimes in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns, in caves; on one occasion, in a hen house, and on two occasions, in coffins. Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the Survey. Some two hundred details reports were made, including an Over-all Report, of which this is a summary. During the course of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and suggestions in connection with their air operations against Japan. While the European War was going on, it was necessary, in many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records might have been irretrievably lost. Survey personnel suffered several casualties, including four killed.

Airpower, especially strategic bombing, frequently generates controversy. Ever since the US Army bought it first "aeroplane" in 1909, debates have raged over the utility, effectiveness, efficiency, legality, and even the morality of air power. These debates continue despite (or perhaps because of) the hundreds of books that have been written on the subject and the scores of examples witnessed. Much of the debate regarding airpower and strategic bombing has been colored by accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and simple untruths. If airpower needs criticizing it must be based on accurate information. This manuscript highlights points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning air power and strategic bombing.

The faculty, staff and students of Air University will find that this Guide is designed to unify their writing stylistically and to give them information about publishing with AU Press. Rapid expansion in the field of electronic media - especially the internet - has made AU research and writing increasingly accessible. Bases on recognized but forward-looking principles of standard English usage, this Guide provides reliable guidance on such matters as punctuation, capitalization, abbreviation, documentation, numbers, spelling, and much more.

General Adams reflects on his experiences in the cold war, during which he served in both manned bombers and missile silos. He tells stories of famous and not-so-famous cold warriors, including some from the US Navy. Some stories are humorous; some stories are tragic. Having traveled extensively in Russia and some former Soviet Union states after retirement, General Adams tells us about his former adversaries, the Soviet cold warriors. In the process, he leaves no doubt about his respect for all who served so valiantly in the "strategic triad"-- the strategic command, the ICBM force, and the submarine Navy.

For more than 35 years a successful part of the post-World War II collective security network was ANZUS a defense alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The Alliance worked well for many years. However, in the mid-1980's events cause the alliance to revise in such a way that a return to its former state became doubtful. Also, Australia and New Zealand wanted their defense forces more self-reliant and increasingly focused own their own region, The author has helped increase awareness in this volume and he discusses many of the issues.

Sponsored by the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) and the Royal United Services Institute, the conference was held by Kings College London on 18-19 May 2009 and focused on deterrence "to help understand and begin to develop policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context." Assembling some of the best minds on deterrence, the conference afforded speakers an opportunity to "invigorate this essential tool for today's policy community." In addition, the conference included two preconference "thought pieces" and two "quick looks" by AFRI personnel.

Colonel Cox examines the command of Lt Gen George H. Brett in his wartime assignments. General Brett's leadership did not take him to four stars, why? Cox looks at the reasons why he was not promoted, especially, as he began his war time service second in command to Gen Henry "Hap" Arnold. In his examination, first published in 2004, Cox shows the reader Brett's outstanding leadership, his limitations, and delves into the interplay of broader factors that ultimately impacted General Brett's career. This book provides insight toward becoming an effective commander and leader.

More than a tool of policy makers to gather intelligence, Air Force reconnaissance efforts shaped early Cold War doctrine and war planning. Dr. Farquhar argues that a lack of information on Soviet strategic capabilities dominated the organization, operational planning, and equipment of the postwar Air Force. To support his assertion, Farquhar traces the development of aerial reconnaissance from the first balloon ascents through World War II as a prelude. He then examines early Cold War peripheral reconnaissance and overflights of the Soviet Union. He explains the evolution of intelligence-gathering technology, bureaucratic growth, and a relative lack of attention paid to electronic warfare before the Korean War. Based primarily on archival sources, this book (first published in 2004) serves as an excellent reference for air doctrine, intelligence, and electronic warfare in the formative years of the Cold War.

From the introduction by Michael Moseley, USAF Chief of Staff: "This book, "Guidelines for Command", is the result of countless hours of research and contains the collective thoughts and lessons learned from many previous commanders. It has a wealth of information to assist you during your tenure as a commander. Use it in conjunction with your personal leadership skills, your base's subject-matter experts, and your fellow commanders to lead our Airmen to new heights". Taking Command. Chapter 2: Leading and Developing Airmen. Chapter 3: Commanding Expeditionary Forces. Chapter 4: Commander's Programs. Chapter 5: Maintaining Standards and Administering Discipline. Chapter 6: Airmen and Family Assistance. Chapter 7: Compliance and Inspections. Appendix 1: Commander's Transtion Checklist. Appendix 2: How to Keep Your Boss Happy.