Bøger i Studies in Public Choice serien

The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation.

Covering the period from 1986 through 2008, this book addresses the scope and impact of Europeanization on the production of national laws, as a part of the Europeanization discussion which raises normative concerns linked to the "democratic deficit" debate.

This is the first course devoted to bioelectrochemistry held within the frame work of the International School of Biophysics.

Covering the period from 1986 through 2008, this book addresses the scope and impact of Europeanization on the production of national laws, as a part of the Europeanization discussion which raises normative concerns linked to the "democratic deficit" debate.

While employing case studies from various global perspectives, this book investigates the role of digital media and competitive advantage, campaigns and the effect of social media, online communication as way of fomenting nonviolent revolutions and the undeniable and important role of the internet on democracy around the world.

Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle If the inaugural date of modern economics is set at 1776 with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, then the analytical tradition in the study of politics is not even a decade younger, commencing nine years later with the publication of the Marquis de Condorcet's Essai sur l'application de l'analyse iz la probabilite des decisions rendues iz la pluralite des voix. The parallel, however, stops there for, unlike Smith and other classical economists who laid an intel­ lectual foundation upon which a century of cumulative scientific research pro­ ceeded, analytical political science suffered fits and starts. Condorcet, himself, acknowledges the earlier work (predating the Essai by some fourteen years) of Borda and, from time to time during the nineteenth century, their contributions were rediscovered by Dodgson, Nanson, and other political philosophers and arithmeticians. But, by century's end, there was nothing in political science to compare to the grand edifice of general equilibrium theory in neoclassical eco­ nomics. Despite roots traversing two centuries, then, the analytical study of poli­ tics is a twentieth-century affair. The initial inspiration and insight of Condorcet was seized upon just after World War II by Duncan Black, who wrote several papers on the equilibrium properties of majority rule in specific contexts (Black, 1948a,b). He expanded upon these themes in his now deservedly famous monograph, The Theory of xi PREFACE xii Committees and Elections, and the lesser-known essay with R. A.

The central concern of this book is how and why the student goes about acquiring whatever human capital he wishes and how the institutional setting of the university influences the amount of human capital that the student acquires.

The central concern of this book is how and why the student goes about acquiring whatever human capital he wishes and how the institutional setting of the university influences the amount of human capital that the student acquires.

While income redistribution is one of the most important functions of modern governments, the world has changed greatly since this first edition of Economics of Income Redistribution was published in 1983.

Economics has been basically a study of the interactions between organizations, with some organizations being so small we only have one person in them.

As the reader of this book probably already knows, I have devoted a great deal of time to the topic which is, rather unfortunately, named rent seeking. Rent seeking, the use of resources in actually lowering total product although benefiting some minority, is, unfortunately, a major activity of most governments.

In developing Legislative Term Limits, the editor has included material that has explicit and testable models about the expected consequences of term limits that reflect Public Choice perspectives. This book contains the best efforts of economists and political scientists to predict the consequences of legislative term limits.

The American Founders distrusted political parties. But this book examines an array of laws, regulations, subsidies and programs in American history that favor the Democrats and Republicans and discourage a challenge by any third party.

The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation.

Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. This book rigorously develops this hypothesis and provides evidence of how "democracy can go too far" and thus decrease economic performance.

George Bush's 1988 campaign pledge, "Read my lips: no new taxes", has become a mantra for those who distrust politicians and bureaucrats. This book addresses the timely issue of speech in policy processes from a political-economy perspective.

Constitutions are very important for societies: a constitution is a document - even in societies based on "unwritten" constitutions - which binds citizens together, creating unity among them, and which forms the framework within which our activities take place.

The editors have assembled the top experimental economists and political scientists specializing in French politics to provide in-depth analysis of the double ballot electoral system, and, more broadly, of the effect of electoral rules on the number of candidates, voter strategies, and ideological choice.

As the essays in this volume demonstrate, to understand why similar reforms had such different effects in the two countries we must examine how electoral systems are embedded in broader institutional and social arrangements, and at the complex interplay of political geography, political history, and the rational calculations of political actors.

The editors have assembled the top experimental economists and political scientists specializing in French politics to provide in-depth analysis of the double ballot electoral system, and, more broadly, of the effect of electoral rules on the number of candidates, voter strategies, and ideological choice.

Using computational models and analytic techniques to relate empirical decision making to normative principles, this book explores connections between constitutional decision making and contractarianism at the constitutional, legislative and electoral levels.

As the essays in this volume demonstrate, to understand why similar reforms had such different effects in the two countries we must examine how electoral systems are embedded in broader institutional and social arrangements, and at the complex interplay of political geography, political history, and the rational calculations of political actors.

How well depoliticized economic theory fares in explaining or predicting economic policy choice depends naturally enough upon how politicized is the economic system in which economic and political agents function. Coverage is provided of a broad spectrum of economic policy choice where markets and politicians interact.

Duverger's Law argues that countries with plurality-based electoral methods will tend to become two-party systems. This book considers national-level evidence for the operation of Duverger's Law in Britain, Canada, India and the United States.

George Bush's 1988 campaign pledge, "Read my lips: no new taxes", has become a mantra for those who distrust politicians and bureaucrats. This book addresses the timely issue of speech in policy processes from a political-economy perspective.

While income redistribution is one of the most important functions of modern governments, the world has changed greatly since this first edition of Economics of Income Redistribution was published in 1983.

In developing Legislative Term Limits, the editor has included material that has explicit and testable models about the expected consequences of term limits that reflect Public Choice perspectives. This book contains the best efforts of economists and political scientists to predict the consequences of legislative term limits.