Bøger i Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy serien

There is a pressing need for an investigation into how time and ethics impact on each other. The essays in this collection raise and investigate some of the key issues that arise at the intersection between these two areas of philosophy. It is for undergraduates, postgraduates and professional philosophers.

This book addresses the topic of 'being bound' from a philosophical and a sociological perspective. It examines several ways in which we are bound. We are bound to acknowledge the truth and to follow laws; we are bound to others and to the world. Who we are is partly defined by those bonds, regardless of whether we live up to them - or even of whether we acknowledge them. Puzzling questions arise from the fact that we are bound, such as: How are those bonds binding? Wherein lies their normative character? A venerable philosophical tradition, particularly since Kant, has provided an account of normativity that crucially appeals to such notions as "e;self-legislation."e; But can our normative bonds be properly understood in these essentially first-personal terms? Many argue that our social condition resists any account of those bonds that fails to acknowledge the perspectives of the second and the third person.The first part of the book explores these themes from a historical perspective in the tradition of transcendental philosophy (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger); it examines the phenomenon of "e;being bound"e;, i.e., why and how we are bound. The second part of the book offers a sociological analysis of social bonds that is both historical and systematic. Based on sociological approaches to "e;solidarity"e; and "e;reflexivity"e;, it explores the way in which the phenomenon of "e;being bound"e; manifests through the concept of a "e;social relation"e;.

He also explores the general issue of theory and practice and discusses a variety of topics in applied ethics - e.g., freedom of artistic expression, the morality of gambling, and the value of forgiveness in psychological counseling.

SEVERINE DENEULIN, MATHIAS NEBEL AND NICHOLAS SAGOVSKY TRANSFORMING UNJUST STRUCTURES The Capability Approach THE CAPABILITY APPROACH Structural injustice has traditionally been the concern of two major academic disciplines: economics and philosophy.

This book provides discussions of both the concept of responsibility and punishment as well as individual and collective responsibility. It demonstrates how the concepts of responsibility and punishment apply to some of the most important problems of our time.

Robert Heeger has been professor of ethics at Utrecht University since 1977, both at the Faculty of Theology and at the Faculty of Philosophy. Moreover, he was one of the first moral philosophers in the Netherlands, and even in Europe, to be involved in environmental ethics and in animal and veterinary ethics.

For instance, how is the narrow philosophical concept of responsibility that was defended from the threat of determinism related to the plural notions of responsibility present in everyday discourse, and how might this more fine-grained understanding of responsibility open up new vistas and challenges for compatibilist theory?

Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century.

Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook.

There is a pressing need for an investigation into how time and ethics impact on each other. The essays in this collection raise and investigate some of the key issues that arise at the intersection between these two areas of philosophy. It is for undergraduates, postgraduates and professional philosophers.

The subject of personal and moral identity is at the centre of interest, not only of academic research within disciplines such as philosophy and psychology, but also of everyday thinking.

Ton van den Beld This book is one of the results of the international conference on Moral Responsibility and Ontology, which was held at Utrecht University in 1 June 1998.

How, if at all, can we do moral philosophy in the light of the radical critique made by Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modem Moral Philosophy"? This is not literally the case, since God cannot permit anything if He does not exist, and those of us who do exist do not permit everything, or at least our parents, employers, and governments do not.

Even though several branches of philosophy meet in the notion of trust, it has nevertheless been largely neglected by mainstream philosophy. The discussion stretches over philosophical psychology, epistemology, political philosophy and moral philosophy.

The anthology is organized around four parts: i) The concept of paternalism and theoretical issues regarding the idea of anti-paternalism, ii) strategies for justifying different forms of paternalism, iii) paternalism in psychiatry and psychotherapy, iv) paternalism and public health, and v) paternalism and reproductive medicine.

In this book, the author disputes the recent trend in metaethics that focuses on reasons rather than norms. The reader is invited to take a new look at the traditional metaethical questions of moral semantics, ontology, and epistemology.

Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century.

Ton van den Beld This book is one of the results of the international conference on Moral Responsibility and Ontology, which was held at Utrecht University in 1 June 1998.

What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? Proposing a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons, this work holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories.

Defends moral cognitivism with a fresh approach. This book argues that if a moral theory can be developed, which can account for widely held, well-established moral beliefs, this would provide a set of truth conditions for moral judgments. It presents a theory designed to do this - and through which major moral disagreements can be resolved.

Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook.

Provides an analysis of both the concept of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy. This book focuses on autonomy in non-decision making situations - patient control over small everyday aspects of care, authenticity and existential aspects of illness, and autonomy and the 'ethics of care'.

Even though several branches of philosophy meet in the notion of trust, it has nevertheless been largely neglected by mainstream philosophy. The discussion stretches over philosophical psychology, epistemology, political philosophy and moral philosophy.

For instance, how is the narrow philosophical concept of responsibility that was defended from the threat of determinism related to the plural notions of responsibility present in everyday discourse, and how might this more fine-grained understanding of responsibility open up new vistas and challenges for compatibilist theory?

This book presents a clear-headed defense of retributivism against several long-standing criticisms. In this third edition, the author extends discussion of wrong-doing to collectives and compensation with an examination of US treatment of Native Americans.

How, if at all, can we do moral philosophy in the light of the radical critique made by Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modem Moral Philosophy"? This is not literally the case, since God cannot permit anything if He does not exist, and those of us who do exist do not permit everything, or at least our parents, employers, and governments do not.

The subject of personal and moral identity is at the centre of interest, not only of academic research within disciplines such as philosophy and psychology, but also of everyday thinking.

The Emotive Theory was theory ahead of its time, and a theory which was, perhaps understandably, misinterpreted, misrepresented, and ridiculed by its critics from the outset. In this work, the author acquaints the reader with what the original emotivists actually claimed, and enriches their claims by psychologically expanding them.