Bøger i World Scientific Series In Economic Theory serien

This volume brings together the collected contributions of Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki, on the theme of learning, experimentation and intertemporal incentives, spanning over two decades of thought (1996 to 2019).The collection starts with a comprehensive introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. The authors describe socially optimal and revenue optimal dynamic mechanism. They cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types, and also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types.Consolidating the research agenda on learning, experimentation, and dynamic mechanism design, which has been prominent in the area of economic theory, the authors present for the first time the main results of the research agenda in this volume.

This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make what players believe about a game a central feature of the theory. The program now called epistemic game theory extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also what each player believes about how the game will be played, and even higher-order beliefs. With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine what different configurations of beliefs among the players imply for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior.

Collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. This book may be used for advanced graduate courses - in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering - and for further research.

Uncertainty within Economic Models is a collection of papers adapting and applying robust control theory to problems in economics and finance. This book extends rational expectations models by including agents who doubt their models and adopt precautionary decisions designed to protect themselves from adverse consequences of model misspecification. This behavior has consequences for what are ordinarily interpreted as market prices of risk, but big parts of which should actually be interpreted as market prices of model uncertainty. The chapters discuss ways of calibrating agents' fears of model misspecification in quantitative contexts.

Presents an axiomatic approach to the problems of prediction, classification, and statistical learning.

Brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation. This title brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

This book brings together the authors'' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory.All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer''s (principal''s) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem.Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model.The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.

Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005. With his 1976 paper, Agreeing to Disagree, Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.