Bøger i Law and Philosophy Library serien

In response to ETA's 1997 kidnappings and murders thousands of Spaniards attended mass demonstrations to express their contempt for violence as a means of political pressure. While from the latter viewpoint citizens wish for the creation of new legal norms, from the former they are just calling for the application of the law.

Building on his contributions to institutional legal theory in Institutional Legal Facts of 1993 (Law and Philosophy Library, volume 18), the author presents a comprehensive theory of legal institutions.

The intertwinement of EC law and national law may create unforeseeability in situations where EC law invades the national cases. What is the relationship between legal certainty, rule of law, various general principles and human rights?

This work thematises such yardsticks, in that it demonstrates the existence, content and factual significance of a relatively well-delimited set of proposition types and proposition patterns, with their accompanying tenability criteria and motivating interests.

This book suggests answers, or at least presents conceptual tools for finding answers, to questions such as: What is an action, and what is an omission? What is the role of intention for the identification of actions? Written in a very accessible style, the book is of interest to lawyers, legal scientists and philosophers.

That strategy is apparent both in Rawls' claim that reasons concerning the right are systematically prior to reasons concerning the good and in Raz's claim that pre-emptive reasons are systematically prior to first-order reasons.

This book explores the trail-blazing Theory of Constitutional Rights of Robert Alexy. The authors combine critical analysis of the structural elements of Alexy's theory with an assessment of its applied relevance, paying special attention to the UK Human Rights Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Questions about the relationship between autonomy and authority are raised in nearly every area of moral philosophy. Indeed, as we shall see as this work progresses, the issues raised are central to moral psychology, religion, professional ethics, medical ethics, and the nature of moral systems generally.

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other.

This book suggests answers, or at least presents conceptual tools for finding answers, to questions such as: What is an action, and what is an omission? What is the role of intention for the identification of actions? Written in a very accessible style, the book is of interest to lawyers, legal scientists and philosophers.

Liberal theories have long insisted that cultural diversity in democratic societies can be accommodated through classical liberal tools, in particular through individual rights, and they have often rejected the claims of cultural minorities for group rights as illiberal.

How do social institutions exist? In his analysis he connects many traditional topics of the philosophy of law, social philosophy and the philosophy of social sciences in a new way. The book is written for legal theorists as well as for political and social philosophers, and theoretically oriented social scientists.

This volume explores the reasons for Hans Kelsen'slack of influence in the United States and proposes ways in which Kelsen'sapproach to law, philosophy, and political, democratic, and internationalrelations theory could be relevant to current debates within the U.S. academyin those areas.

in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

It is not unusual that formal and informal discussions about the political system, its virtues, and its many defects, conclude in a discussion about impartiality. We show our concerns with impartiality when, facing a particular problem, we try to figure out the best solution for all of us, given our conflicting interests.

This book critically examines the conception of legal science and the nature of law developed by Hans Kelsen. It provides a single, dedicated space for a range of established European scholars to engage with the influential work of this Austrian jurist, legal philosopher, and political philosopher.The introduction provides a thematization of the Kelsenian notion of law as a legal science. Divided into six parts, the chapter contributions feature distinct levels of analysis. Overall, the structure of the book provides a sustained reflection upon central aspects of Kelsenian legal science and the nature of law.Parts one and two examine the validity of the project of Kelsenian legal science with particular reference to the social fact thesis, the notion of a science of positive law and the specifically Kelsenian concept of the basic norm (Grundnorm). The next three parts engage in a critical analysis of the relationship of Kelsenian legal science to constitutionalism, practical reason, and human rights.The last part involves an examination of the continued pertinence of Kelsenian legal science as a theory of the nature of law with a particular focus upon contemporary non-positivist theories of law. The conclusion discusses the increasing distance of contemporary theories of legal positivism from a Kelsenian notion of legal science in its consideration of the nature of law.

In these chapters, I argue for the comparative superiority of the capacities model of responsibility and offer recommendations for changes in current legal conceptions and standards of liability.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions.

During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo-American and European traditions.

lt is a commonplace that law and morality intersect and interpenetrate in all the areas of legal decision-making; that in order to make sense of constitutional, statutory or common-law questions, judges and other legal decision-makers must first resolve certain philosophical issues which include moral judgments of right and wrang_ This is particularly evident with regard to constitutional interpretation, especially when constitutions give a mandate for the protection of the substantive norms and values entrenched as constitutional rights. In these Situations, as a leading contemporary legal philosopher observed, the "Constitution fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on an answer to complex moral 1 problems". But the need for substantive value elucidation is not confined, of course, only to constitutional interpretation under Bills of Rights. This, however, immediately raises a dilemma stemming from the moral diversity and pluralism of modern liberal societies. How can law remain sensitive to this pluralism and yet provide clear answers to the problems which call for a legal resolution? Sharply conflicting values in modern societies clash in the debates over the death penalty, abortion, homosexuality, separation of state and religion, the scope of the freedom of the press, or affirmative action. lt would often be difficult to discern a broader consensus within which these clashes of values operate, unless this consensus were described in such vague terms as to render it practically meaningless.

The book investigates the role of law and legal experts in the organisational dynamics of a population, demonstrating that law is a stable practice among those who (in virtue of the special knowledge they master) are called upon to select the 'normative facts' of a population, i.e.

This collection of essays is the outcome of a workshop with Scott Shapiro on The Planning Theory of Law that took place in December 2009 at Bocconi University.

This unique monograph on the Rawlsian principles of contract law advocates an understanding of the topic based on common agreement that contractual terms be reasonable-in other words, acceptable to reasonable people seeking equitable cooperation with others.

This book offers its readers an overview of recent developments in the theory of legal argumentation written by representatives from various disciplines, including argumentation theory, philosophy of law, logic and artificial intelligence.